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ABSTRACT. Governments worldwide are keen to encourage PPP schemes, however PPP is not a 
foolproof business. Many local governments and private investors have suffered severe or trying expe-
riences. In this research, 10 case studies were conducted to identify the obstacles and difficulties for 
successful implementation of PPP projects from the perspective of government guarantees. These PPP 
projects include two water supply plants, two sewage treatment plants, two power supply plants, two 
highway projects, and two bridge projects. The findings obtained indicate that the local governments 
are familiar with “the type of guarantees” to provide to the private investor but they are unsure of 
the “amount” that should be given. Many PPP projects have therefore been heavily criticized for over 
benefiting the private investors as the government provides them with too many guarantees. The 
inappropriate guarantees offered by the government are regarded as one of the root causes of PPP 
projects’ failure. The lessons learned are valuable for determining appropriate government guarantees 
for future PPP projects and broadening the opportunities for infrastructure development with PPP 
procurement model. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Public Private Partnership (PPP) is a well-estab-
lished procurement model for delivering public in-
frastructure projects in which “both the public and 
the private investor will contribute their expertise 
and resources to the project and share the risks 
involved” (Cheung et al. 2010). Successful imple-
mentation of PPP demands many prerequisites, 
such as a business-friendly environment, a well-
established legal system, a clean administration 
and open markets (Sobhiyah et al. 2009). Given 
the high-risks involved and the lack of favorable 
environment needed, many local governments usu-
ally provide supports (government guarantees) in 
promoting the success of PPP projects to the ex-
tent allowed by laws, policies, and their capacities 
(Zhou 2004). However, determining a reasonable 
government guarantee for concession contract 
is a complicated issue. As too many guarantees 
provided by the government would decrease so-
cial welfare, increase project financing costs, and 
even induce government credit risks, while too 
few guarantees provided may make the project 
unfeasible in economic viability (Sobhiyah et al. 
2009). Thus, a comprehensive and reasonable gov-
ernment guarantee structure is necessary for the 
success of PPP projects. This paper aims to take a 
closer look at the government guarantees in PPP 
projects through content analysis of cases, and ex-
plore management implications for determining 
appropriate government guarantees for concession 
contract. The study is believed to provide govern-
ments with practical experiences to design equita-
ble risk sharing scheme and to benefit the private 
investor from effectively mitigating and managing 
risks in future PPP projects. * Corresponding author. E–mail: zjyelinxu@163.com
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The government’s goal in launching PPP schemes 
is to facilitate infrastructure development under 
risks acceptable to the private investor who would 
in turn gain “reasonable but not excessive” returns 
(Zhang, Kumaraswamy 2001). However, privatiza-
tion of infrastructure involves political, economic, 
legal, and environmental dimensions (Zhang 2005). 
To achieve a “win-win” result for both government 
and private investor, PPP requires favorable con-
ditions. Longer-term uncertainties and wider-risk 
portfolios of PPP projects need substantial govern-
ment guarantees to promote their success (Zhang, 
Kumaraswamy 2001). A comprehensive literature 
review (e.g. Lu 2006; Wang 2001; Liu 2004a) indi-
cates that government guarantee may involve vari-
ous aspects, such as political and legal guarantee, 
financing guarantee, construction and operation 
guarantee, and macro-economic environment guar-
antee as compiled in Table 1. Government guaran-
tees have been extensively adopted in PPP projects 
Table 1. A summary of government guarantees (GG) in PPP concession contract
Political  
and legal  
guarantee
GG1: Franchise right 
guarantee 
The government promises don’t retract franchise right in advance during the concession 
period. If, indeed required by public interests, the municipal government or its author-
ized department will provide reasonable reimbursement to the private investor. 
GG2: Legal risk guar-
antee
The changes of legal environment will inevitably change the rights and obligations of 
PPP participants, and affect the economic anticipation of concessionaire. When the legal 
changes bring the private investor economic loss beyond a certain extent, the govern-
ment promise to compensate the private investor’s losses.
GG3: Administrative 
license guarantee
The local government promises that the project approval documents, such as government 
ratifications, licenses or consents needed in the development of projects, can be obtained 
smoothly.
GG4: Free  
business  
guarantee
The government permits the private investor to operate other facilities within the pre-




GG5: Loan  
guarantee
The government provide guarantee to the bank for private investor’s debts, and convince 
that the private investor has the capability to make repayments on time.
GG6: Provision of 
standby loans
When the business income is reduced to a minimum due to some reasons, the govern-
ment will provide standby loans to repay the prior debts for the private investor.
GG7: Stock capital 
guarantee







The host government provides competition protection to the private investor so as to 
guarantee the anticipated income. For example, the government promises not to build a 
secondary competitive project in a certain times.
GG9: Raw  
material supply guar-
antee
The government guarantees to provide the raw materials needed in project construction 




The government promises to provide the private investor with minimum income guar-
antees in the aspects of minimum purchase amount, minimum purchase price, or/and 
minimum investment earnings. 
GG11: Force  
Majeure guarantee
The government provides some financial support to offset the uninsurable force majeure 
risks for the private investor.
GG12: logistical support 
guarantee
The host government promises to provide logistical support to the private investor, in-
cluding land, labor forces, and relevant necessary infrastructures such as roads, electric 
wires and communication facilities needed in the construction and operation of PPP pro-
jects.
GG13: Tax  
preference guarantee
The local government promise to provide the private investor with guaranties on tax 






When inflation exceeds the agreed margin, the government guarantees to reimburse 
the private investor by adjusting the concession price or/and extending the concession 
period.
GG15: Foreign  
exchange guarantee
The government promises that the investors can exchange the project income into con-
vertible currency and remit it abroad. If the exchange rate fluctuation exceeds the agreed 
margin, the government guarantees to share the losses incurred from the fluctuations of 
exchange rate, and provide investors with economic reimbursement.
GG16: Interest rate 
guarantee
The host government provides the private investor with interest rate guarantee. When 
the increase of interest rate exceeds the prescribed percentage within the concession 
period, the private investor will obtain reimbursement from the government. 
Other GG17: Comfort letter The comfort letter issued by the government is not legally binding, but is important in 
project financing as an intention guarantee.
* Adopted from Lu (2006), Wang (2001) and Liu (2004b).
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across countries and sectors, such as North-South 
highway project in Malaysia, Karachi power plant 
in Pakistan (Kumaraswamy, Zhang 2001), Laibin 
B power plant in China (Wang, Tiong 2000), Rude-
shur gas turbine power station in Iran (Sobhiyah 
et al. 2009), Huaibei power plant in China (Smith 
et al. 2004), and harbor tunnel in Sydney (Yeo 
2003).
Early project practices also indicate that gov-
ernment guarantee is not only an important factor 
for improving the enthusiasm of private capital to 
participate in PPP projects, but can also greatly 
affect a PPP project’s financial feasibility (Deng 
2007). Take one of the most classic cases in the 
world, Channel Tunnel as an example, in order 
to enhance the project’s resistibility to market 
risks, the UK and French government provided 
a series of guarantees to the private investor to 
ensure the tunnel’s financial viability (Ke et al. 
2008). These guarantees include: 1) competition 
protection guarantee: no-secondary facility will 
be built in next 33 years; 2) commercial independ-
ence guarantee: grant concession pricing right to 
the private investor; 3) long-term sales guarantee: 
establish interconnection with the railway network. 
Ke et al. (2008) considered that government guar-
antees adopted in this project set a good example 
for the implementation of subsequent PPP projects 
in the past decades. Despite the construction cost 
was overspent due to geological conditions and the 
present operating status is still not optimistic, the 
method for dealing with huge risks through gov-
ernment guarantee is appraisable. 
Reasonable government guarantee structure 
is vital to PPP project’s success. However, if the 
government guarantee is inequitably or inappro-
priately provided, or beyond the capacity of the 
government, PPP projects would fail (Xu 2010). 
A failing PPP project may further deter investors 
from investing in similar projects or in the same 
area and ultimately, the host government will suf-
fer a greater loss in economic and social develop-
ment (Tam 1999). Moreover, as the application of 
PPP in many areas hasn’t been fully developed yet, 
many local governments lack necessary knowledge 
in PPP procurement and have less experience of 
concession projects than private investors (Deng 
2007). The insufficiency of information can easily 
induce the governments to make undue or wrong 
decisions on government guarantees (Deng 2007). 
Take the most famous project, Sha Jiao B power 
plant in China as an example, the government 
provided excessive guarantees to Hehe power Ltd. 
of Hong Kong for attracting private capital, which 
caused the government to assume 16.8 billion HK 
Dollar of exchange rate losses and 4.7 billion CNY 
of fuel cost escalation losses, while the private in-
vestor’s internal rate of return during the conces-
sion period reached 38.8% (Cao 2006). 
In order to take a closer look at the government 
guarantees in PPP projects, the remainder of the 
paper is organized as follows. The third section pre-
sents the background of 10 cases and the following 
fourth section deals with the relationship between 
government guarantees and corresponding project 
performance. Afterwards, the analysis and discus-
sion of the ten case studies is presented. Finally 
the last section provides the conclusion remarks.
3. BACKGROUND OF SELECTED CASES 
Case studies were selected as an appropriate mean 
for the research in identifying how government 
guarantees influence the success of PPP projects. 
It is considered the preferred research strategy 
when a “how” or “why” question is being asked 
about a contemporary set of events over which 
the investigator has little or no control (Laishram, 
Satyanarayana 2009; Yin 2009). A total of 34 PPP 
projects were first collected from journal papers, 
doctoral/master thesis, and news reports from of-
ficial media. 10 of them were finally selected and 
studied in this study as they contained all the in-
formation as required according to the project se-
lection criteria as follows:
(1) The projects have detailed information on 
government guarantees and their corresponding 
project performance can serve the purpose for an 
in-depth investigation; 
(2) The projects cover different types;
(3) The projects are distributed in different cit-
ies and operated under different social, economi-
cal, political and legal environments; 
(4) The data obtained can be triangulated to en-
sure the internal validity of the results (Yin 2009). 
Their background information is summarized 
in Table 2. To improve the generality of research 
findings, these cases were selected from five differ-
ent project types including water supply, sewage 
treatment, power supply, highway, and bridge as 
PPPs are widely used in these sectors.
4. GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES 
AND CORRESPONDING PROJECT 
PERFORMANCE OF SELECTED CASES 
This section illustrates government guarantees pro-
vided in the above ten cases and their correspond-
359Determining appropriate government guarantees for concession contract: lessons learned from 10 PPP ...























































































































7 Xiang Fan 
Highway of Hu 
Bei, China
Highway 185.4 km 541 million 
USD
3.5 years 35 years Xiangfan 
highway 
Ltd.








Highway 39 km 210 million 
USD











9 CiTong bridge 
of Quan Zhou, 
China
Bridge 1.530 km 36 million 
USD






10 Nanjing No. 3 
Yangtze River 
Bridge, China
Bridge 4.744 km 454 million 
USD








ing project performances to present the impact of 
government guarantee on PPP projects’ implemen-
tation. Various types of information on the 10 pro-
jects have been collected. Data collected in different 
means were thoroughly analyzed by content analy-
sis, which contains a systematic analytic process of 
three steps, (1) identification of government guar-
antees provided in each project, (2) identification of 
their corresponding project performances, and (3) 
analysis of the relationship between government 
guarantees and their corresponding project per-
formance (Song et al. 2013). The coding system for 
government guarantees, as shown in Table 3, fol-
lows the coding order in Table 1. 
Seven out of the ten cases appear to be failure 
or less successful (as local government assumed ex-
cessive responsibilities, which actually exceed their 
risk management and sustainment capability). 
Three are seen as successful, or at least, as most 
of the project stakeholders are happy with their 
project performances. The criteria for measuring 
project success include three dimensions (Khang, 
Moe 2008): (1) The efficiency of the implementation 
process (time, cost, technical goals and working 
relationship); (2) Products and service quality of 
PPP projects; (3) The satisfaction of stakeholders. 
To simplify the information of above projects, gov-
ernment guarantees and their corresponding PPP 
project performances were extracted and summa-
rized in Table 3.
5. LESSONS LEARNED FROM CASES
To sort the findings reported above, the govern-
ment guarantee can be classified into three cat-
egories.
(1) The government provided excessive guaran-
tees to the private investor. 
(2) The government provided appropriate guar-
antees to the private investor. 
(3) The government provided insufficient guar-
antees to the private investor. 
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An analysis of project performance indicates 
that the government guarantees provided in six 
cases out of the ten were inappropriate (excessive 
or insufficient). Five out of six cases provided ex-
cessive guarantees to the private investor and one 
provide inadequate support to its concessionaire as 
compiled in Table 4. 
Table 4 indicates that governments assumed 
excessive responsibilities in half of PPP projects, 
which actually exceed their risk management and 
sustainment capability. It may be due to the fact 
that developing market/government, with imper-
fect legal and regulation systems and unstable 
market environments and greater investment 
risks, tends to make excessive commitments and 
guarantees to the private party for the purpose 
of attracting private funding (Deng 2007). How-
ever, such unreasonable government guarantees 
led to unsuccessful project performance to the PPP 
scheme as shown in the following cases: 
 – In Case 1, Chengdu Municipal Government 
not only assumed political and legal change 
risks but also bore market risk, raw water 
supply risk, and partial exchange rate risk. 
The risk sharing mechanism in this project is 
significantly unreasonable. Generally, a rea-
Table 4. Appropriateness of government guarantees provided in ten cases
Case 
No.
Project name/location Government guarantee Note 
Excessive Appropriate Insufficient
1 No. 6 water plant of Chengdu, 
China
× Excessive operating income  
guarantee Excessive raw material 
supply guarantee 
2 No. 9 water plant of Shenyang, 
China 
× Excessive operating income  
guarantee
3 Bei Jiao sewage treatment 
plant, China 
×
4 HuiJin sewage plant of Chang-
Cun, China 
× Excessive operating income  
guarantee
5 Laibin B power plant, China × Excessive operating income  
guarantee
6 Sha Jiao B power plant, China × Excessive operating income  
guarantee
Excessive foreign exchange  
guarantee
Excessive raw material supply  
guarantee
7 Xiang Fan Highway of Hu Bei, 
China
×
8 An-Jing Highway of YunNan, 
China
×
9 CiTong bridge of Quan Zhou, 
China
× Inadequate competition protection 
10 Nanjing No. 3 Yangtze River 
Bridge, China
×
sonable sharing structure is that the private 
investor bears the price risk of raw water, 
while the market risks, directly arising from 
price fluctuations, were shared between the 
government and the private investor through 
a price adjustment mechanism. The private 
investor could transfer or mitigate such risks 
through signing a long-term energy and raw 
material supply agreement with the suppli-
er. However, in this project, raw water sup-
ply risk was solely assumed by Chengdu Mu-
nicipal Government, as well as all operating 
revenue risks. This resulted in the Chengdu 
Water Supply Company to use two third of 
the water fee revenue to pay for B Plant’s 
clean water (Xu 2004). 
 – In Case 2, the average water price in Shen-
yang was 1.4 Yuan/ton in 1996, but Shenyang 
Water Supply Company paid 2.5 Yuan/ton to 
No. 9 Water plant. Since the government pro-
vided excessive guarantee on fixed rate of in-
vestment returns, the private investor recov-
ered all principal of investments during the 
first five years, and would continue to recover 
profits in following 15 years (Liu 2004b). 
 – In Case 4, the government provided the pri-
vate investor a purchase guarantee of no less 
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than 390,000 tons of sewage at the price of 
0.60 Yuan per ton. The high revenue guaran-
tee results in the sewage discharge company, 
representing the government, was unable to 
pay the sewage treatment fee to the private 
investor within two years of operation (Zi 
2005).
 – In Case 5, Guangxi Government promised 
Laibin B Power Plant to purchase 3.5 billion 
KWH of electricity per year at the price of 
0.39 Yuan per KWH. However, the average 
price of electricity supplied by the other pow-
er plants in Guangxi province was just 0.28 
Yuan. The excessive price guarantee became 
a millstone round the neck of the local gov-
ernment (Zhou 2004). 
 – In Case 6, the private investor’s internal 
rate of return during the concession period 
reached 38.8%. While the government as-
sumed 16.8 billion HK Dollar of exchange 
rate losses and 4.7 billion CNY of fuel cost 
escalation losses (Cao 2006). 
Government guarantees can reduce risk but 
are not free of cost (Wibowo et al. 2012; Wibowo 
2004). Excessive guarantees will lead to high per-
formance costs for the government and prevent the 
concession agreement to be fulfilled smoothly. This 
has been verified by the above cases. 
The governments usually do not know the 
full extent of contingent liabilities when provid-
ing guarantees, because they account and record 
guarantee costs only when guarantees come due 
(Wibowo 2004). In above five cases, operating 
revenue guarantee is the first risky government 
guarantee, which needs both sides’ special atten-
tion, as nearly all projects with excessive revenue 
guarantees eventually fail or do not succeed. The 
second risky guarantee is raw material supply and 
the third is foreign exchange guarantee as shown 
in Table 4. According to the principle of risk allo-
cation, risks should be allocated to the party best 
able to handle them, i.e. the risk bearer should be 
the one most able to prevent risk from occurring 
and able to minimize the consequences if risk does 
occur. However, it has never been easy to obtain 
an equitable risk sharing, as so many other factors 
also have strong impacts on it, such as bargaining 
power and negotiation tactics of practitioners, risk 
attitude, market compulsion caused by competi-
tion, cooperation history, and so on (Lam 1999). 
At the present, many local governments in China 
starve for private capital and lack necessary ex-
pertise and experience in PPP implementation. 
They usually tend to offer excessive preferential 
conditions to the private investors for attracting 
private funding by promising fixed rate of invest-
ment returns, minimum purchase amount, and 
fixed price of products or services. These guaran-
tees not only lead the private investor to have a 
high expectation on investment return rate, but 
also make the private investor less motivated to be 
efficient in project management or/and risk man-
agement because it believes that the local govern-
ment will provide a downside protection for risk 
losses (Wibowo 2004). However, the fulfillment of 
such unreasonable government guarantee would 
be greatly influenced by the change of session of 
the local government, the conflict between central 
policies and local ones, and the change of market 
environment (Deng 2007). Thus, the rate for gov-
ernment’s breach of contract is rather high and 
many projects were therefore liquidated, such as 
that in case 4.
Compared to developing markets, developed 
markets or regions have relatively mature mar-
kets, sound legal systems, and fewer state risks. 
In the developed markets, governments are usu-
ally only willing to bear the systematic risks and 
necessary commercial risks relevant to the projects 
(Zhao 2002). Take Hong Kong tunnel as an exam-
ple, the franchise consortia of HK tunnel assumed 
risks related to construction, engineering, geology, 
environment, climate, financing, inflation, and cost 
escalation. The government provided guarantee on 
the risk of land acquisition; however, no guaran-
tees or warranties are given with regard to the pro-
gram for commencement or completion, tax exemp-
tion, minimum traffic flows, economic returns, and 
future competitive routes (Zhang, Kumaraswamy 
2001). Similar projects located in western countries 
also have similar government guarantee structure. 
The practices of above five cases confirmed that 
excessive guarantee would result in difficulties for 
the government to perform its obligation, and may 
even lead to project failure. However, inadequate 
government guarantee may also have a similar 
negative impact on project’s implementation. 
 – Case 9: the government cancelled the toll for 
Quanzhou Bridge, which is parallel to Citong 
Bridge from 2005. The operating revenue of 
Citong Bridge is then declined immediately, 
and the private investor faced a huge fi-
nancial crisis. It was evaluated that Citong 
Bridge’s original investment recovery goal 
was unable to be achieved (Ji 2006). 
Different from the above six failed cases, the 
government guarantee provided in Case 3 are 
relatively reasonable. Due to the good reputation 
of local government (means lower credit risk), the 
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private investor requested a relatively reasonable 
investment return guarantee i.e. 70% of the de-
signed water amount at a price of 0.35Yuan/ton. 
The relatively equitable risk sharing promoted the 
success of this project to some extent. The project 
is currently operating smoothly. This case implies 
that the local government’s high credibility may be 
beneficial for mitigating the investment risks and 
decreasing the private investor’s requisition on 
government guarantee (Lu 2006). Wibowo (2004) 
and Irwin et al. (1999) also considered that one 
of the bests that a government can do to make a 
project more attractive without providing excessive 
guarantees is to formulate good policies and estab-
lish a favorable environment that generally reduce 
risks and raise expected returns. 
In addition, the performances of cases 7, 8, and 
10 indicate that the risk of the project itself is still 
the key factor for the government to fulfill the con-
tract. No matter how enthusiastic the government 
is and how attractive its guarantees are, sufficient 
market study is still the perquisite to the success 
of PPP projects (Wang, Tiong 2000). For example, 
due to inaccurate market forecast, Nanjing No. 3 
Yangtze River Bridge of case 10 suffered a huge 
market risks. Although the government provided 
concession price guarantee and non-competition 
protection, the actual traffic volume only reached 
62% of the designed volume due to the remote loca-
tion of the bridge, insufficient roads that connect 
the bridge, and the slow increase of traffic volume 
(Li 2006). Since it was open to the public in Oc-
tober 2005, the cumulative deficits of the project 
have reached more than 15 million USD in past 
four years (Li 2006). On the contrary, the actual 
traffic volume of cases 7 and 8 are far more than 
anticipated; the projects are receiving considerable 
profits and have promising futures (Zhao 2002; Ma 
2004). These three cases imply that government 
guarantees should not be deemed the only tool to 
ensure the success of PPP projects, which is more 
greatly dependent on the financial viability of pro-
jects themselves. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
PPP model offers a viable vehicle for accelerating 
the pace of infrastructure construction and eco-
nomic development. However, not all projects are 
successful. In this study, ten typical PPP examples 
were selected and analyzed to explore root causes 
behind successful implementation of PPP projects 
from the perspective of government guarantee. 
Three valuable experiences were learnt, which in-
clude: 
1. There are a total of 17 different government 
guarantees available. However, operating 
revenue guarantee, raw material supply 
guarantee, foreign exchange guarantee and 
competition protection guarantee are the 
four most common guarantees adopted in 
China’s PPP concession contracts. 
2. An analysis of 10 PPP cases reinforces that 
government guarantees can reduce risk but 
are not free of cost. Excessive guarantees will 
lead to high performance costs for the gov-
ernment and prevent the concession agree-
ment to be fulfilled smoothly.
3. The economic viability of the project self, 
instead of government guarantees is the 
key factor for the success of PPP projects. 
Well-established regulatory framework and 
favorable project implementation environ-
ment are beneficial to decrease the private 
investor’s requirement on government guar-
antees. 
The result from the case studies indicate that 
both private and public sectors need to have a bet-
ter understanding of risk sharing in order to de-
velop a reasonable guarantee mechanism/structure 
and enable the project to generate better outcomes. 
Moreover, there is a limitation in this research. 
The case studied may not precisely reflect the gen-
eralized features of PPP projects in China. Further 
research is needed to verify the research results 
obtained. 
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